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TERRORISM AND THE DEMOCRATIC
STATE
Alona E. Evans*
A TIME OF TERROR: How DEMOCRATIC SOCIETIES RESPOND TO
REVOLUTIONARY VIOLENCE. By J. Bowyer Bell. New York: Basic
Books. 1978. Pp. xii, 292. $10.95.
Whether or not one agrees with Bowyer Bell's arguments or
his conclusions, one must admit that he is provocative in his
analyses and that he demonstrates substantial insight into the
murky ramifications of the complex subject of terrorism. In A
Time of Terror, Bowyer Bell, Senior Research Associate at
Columbia University's Institute of War and Peace Studies, presents a thoughtful analysis of the impact of terrorism upon democratic states during the past decade. He contends that these
• states have achieved only limited success in dealing with the
terrorist menace because they have failed to recognize the need
to develop "a flexible pragmatism" (p. 275). That pragmatism
requires that they rely upon democratic values, "contemplate
accommodation and concession" to terrorists, recognize fundamental nationalistic aspirations (such as those of the Basques,
Bretons, or the Ulster minority), and maintain "the close linkage
between law and justice rather than law and order" (p. 275). The
author warns that there are "no solutions in open societies" (p.
278) to control of terrorism short ofmeasutes which would destroy
a democratic order. Rather, policies must be developed to deal
with two particular types of terrorists, those with legitimate
grievances and those who are "irrelevant to reality" (p. 278).
The book consists of three parts, a conclusion, and a bibliographical note. The first part begins with an account of the hijacking of a TWA aircraft in September 1976 from New York to
Paris by five persons who described themselves as Fighters for
Free Croatia. This episode, while not the "first successful American hijack in years" (p. 15) but rather the first spectacular hijacking of an American aircraft to a foreign destination since 1972,
provides the point of departure for the author's contention that
despite their previous experience with hijackers, the democratic
states involved in this hijacking were uncertain as to the appropriate response, while the hijackers achieved what they wanted,
* Kendall Professor of Political Science, Wellesley College. A.B. 1940, Ph.D. 1945,
Duke University.-Ed.
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i.e., extensive media coverage for their cause. The author then
describes various users of violence, including criminals, psychopaths, vigilantes, and revolutionaries who have real or ostensible
political objectives and who engage in acts of violence which have
international ramifications. The new breed of revolutionaries, or
"new terrorists," who emerged a decade ago have employed such
tactics as aircraft hijacking and bombing, massacring passengers
in air terminals, and kidnapping and murdering diplomats and
representatives of multinational corporations.
The second part of the book describes the various responses
of democratic states to international terrorist activity after 1970.
These responses, ranging from deterrent and preventive measures
to retaliation and humanitarian intervention, have been marked
by some successes but also by many failures. In Bell's opinion,
democratic states have learned much about handling terrorism
during this decade. Their policies have evolved from placing
"skymarshals" on aircraft; through rigidly refusing to negotiate
with terrorists, to the contemporary use of concession and accommodation. Nevertheless, little consensus as to policy has emerged
among these states.
The third section consists of studies of terrorism in the Republic of Ireland and in Italy. The Irish, by following a policy of
concession and coercion, have preserved the country's democratic
institutions while controlling the Irish Republican Army (IRA).
But, Bell argues, the Italian experience with terrorism has been
"muddled and uncertain" (p. 203), raising considerable doubt as
to whether this ·democratic state can "restructure its society" (p.
259) so as to be able to cope with terrorism among its many other
political, social, and economic problems. Bell concludes that
"[t]error . . . has become almost institutionalized" (p. 263) in
Western democratic states. He suggests that terrorism might
well be viewed as a "natural calamity,"-"deadly but irrelevant
to the major current of national life" (p. 264). Terrorist acts, he
points out, in fact cause far less damage to persons. and property
than do such natural disasters as hurricanes. Bell admits, however, that most citizens, and their governments, do not see
terrorist acts in the same terms as natural disasters. He observes
that the public is not terrorized but incensed by terrorism.
Democratic governments, Bell contends, must respond by devising policies to control terrorism while at the same time preserving
democratic values, but he offers little guidance on how to achieve
this objective.
A Time of Terror is a generalist's book designed to provide
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its reader with a succinct examination of the problems arising
from dealing with contemporary terrorism and to make some recommendations as to ways of dealing with these problems. There
can be little disagreement with Bell's view that terrorism is pervasive, that acts of terror are committed by a variety of persons
whose motives are not always apparent, and that democratic
states must respond with a corresponding variety of approaches.
It is not clear, however, that his recommendation of concessions
to fundamental nationalistic aspirations (a recommendation
which would undermine the United Nations's response to terrorism) provides a realistic solution. If Uli,ter became part of the
Irish Republic, would the IRA Provos and the like quietly fade
away, or would they turn their attention to other ventures? In
other words, terrorism may be a preferred way of life for some of
its practitioners. As for the Croatian terrorists who have surfaced
in the United States, Sweden, and elsewhere, it is unclear how
the Western democracies could meet their demands for a free
Croatia.
Bell is not impressed by efforts to establish legal controls of
terrorism by treaties, laws, and prosecution. It should be recognized, however, that information about the arrest, prosecution,
sentencing, and release of terrorists, or about grants of political
asylum to them, is hard to come by for countries other than the
United States and that no effective case can be made as to the
adequacy or inadequacy of legal controls without better information. In my view, the record of prosecution of terrorists in the
Western democracies is quite good, given the usual difficulties of
prosecution in their criminal justice systems. Where governments
have released terrorists from prisons in deals with other terrorists
in order to save the lives of hostages, such acts might be excused
as examples of that "accommodation and concession" (p. 275)
which Bell recommends. Certainly, for the policymaker, conceding to political blackmail is a last resort in a desperate situation.
Resort to international agreements-in order to establish common bases for control of international terrorism has been undertaken because governments, democratic and otherwise, are becoming aware that no state is secure from terrorism. For example,
more than ninety states are now bound by the Tokyo, Hague, and
Montreal Conventions, which are directed against offenses involving international civil aviation. While Bell takes a dim view
of treaty-making as an effective means to control terrorism, he is
impressed by the 1973 exchange of notes between the United
States and Cuba (denounced by Cuba, effective April 1977), to
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which he ascribes the end of aircraft hijacking between those
countries. Although there was only one hijacking to Cuba from
the United States during the four years while the agreement was
in effect, and apparently none since the agreement was terminated, the decline in hijacking to Cuba cannot be ascribed,
wholly or in the main, to this agreement or its subsequent influence. In any analysis of the recent record of the hijacking of civil
aircraft in the United States, whether to foreign or domestic destinations, one must recognize the importance of the preventive
effect of the strict security measures which are carried out at
American airports as well as the deterrent effect of the enforcement of relevant punitive legislation in this country. The aircraft
which was hijacked to Cuba during the lifetime of the agreement
was a "general aviation" aircraft. These aircraft were not subject
to the security regulations which were then applied to commercial
aviation.
A Time of Terror is a readable and thoughtful examination
of a difficult condition of our time. It is a condition which must
be faced by the citizens and governments of democratic states if
they are to control terrorism while preserving their democratic
system of values.

